This article examines the effect of government capital injections into financially troubled banks on corporate investment during the Japanese banking crisis of the late 1990s. By helping banks meet the capital requirements imposed by Japanese banking regulation, recapitalization enables banks to respond to loan demands, which could help firms increase their investment. To test this mechanism empirically, we combine the balance sheet data of Japanese manufacturing firms with bank balance sheet data and estimate a linear investment model where the investment rate is a function of not only firm productivity and size but also bank regulatory capital ratios. We find that the coefficient of the interaction between a firm's total factor productivity measure and a bank's capital ratio is positive and significant, implying that the bank's capital ratio affects more productive firms. Counterfactual policy experiments suggest that capital injections made in March 1998 and 1999 had a negligible impact on the average investment rate, although there was a reallocation effect, shifting investments from low-to high-productivity firms.
Introduction
This paper examines the effect of government capital injections into financially troubled banks on the level of firm investment during the Japanese banking crisis. During the banking crisis of 1997, under the risk-based capital requirements imposed on banks, Japan experienced a sharp decline in bank loans to firms and Japanese corporate investments fell in 1998 and 1999. According to the Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan (TANKAN) of the Bank of Japan, there was a sharp deterioration of "banks' willingness to lend" during the first quarter of 1998 (Figure 1 ). To cope with the banking crisis, the Japanese government made capital injections of 1.8 trillion Japanese yen in March 1998 and 7.5 trillion Japanese yen in March 1999 into the top city, trust, and long-term credit banks and other regional banks in the form of purchases of preferred stock or subordinated debt or as subordinated loans. These capital injections helped many banks improve their capital ratios and attain the capital standard required under the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I) . 1
As Figure 2 shows, the distribution of the regulatory capital adequacy ratio, which we call the Basel I capital ratio (BCR), weighted by loan supply across banks substantially shifted upward from 1997 to 1999.
One of the primary goals of the capital injection policy in Japan was to promote firm investment by improving bank capital ratios in the hope of increasing bank lending to firms (Montgomery and Shimizutani (2009) ). Did the capital injection promote investments in Japan? If so, how large was the effect? Given that over 10 trillion yen of Japanese taxpayer money (roughly 2% of Japan's nominal gross domestic product) was spent on capital injections into troubled banks, these are important policy questions. However, while a large body of research investigates whether the credit crunch in Japan constrained firm investments (Caballero et al. (2008) ; Hayashi and Prescott (2002) ; Hori et al. (2006) ; 1 More precisely, Japanese banking regulations required banks with international operations to have a capital to risk-weighted asset ratio greater than 8%, as specified by Basel I. The regulations also required banks with only domestic operations to have at least a 4% capital ratio, slightly modifying the regulatory capital ratio. The Japanese government strengthened the enforcement of bank capital requirements by introducing the Prompt Corrective Action in April 1998, which enabled regulators to order troubled banks to take remedial action, depending on the banks' regulatory capital adequacy ratios. See Section 2 for more details. Hosono (2006) ; Ito and Sasaki (2002) ; Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) ; Peek and Rosengren (2000) ; Woo (2003) ), few empirical studies (e.g., Giannetti and Simonov (2013) , hereafter GS) quantitatively assess the extent to which government capital injections affected firm investments by relaxing firms' financial constraints.
To examine the firm investment effect of the capital injection into banks, we construct a unique data set, combining Japanese firm-level financial statement data with bank balance sheet data. Using the matched firm-bank data, we first examine whether capital injections affect the supply of credit from banks to firms. To examine the effect on corporate investment, we regress corporate investment on the weighted average of banks' BCR, as well as various firm characteristics. We use the BCR because we are interested in a specific mechanism: the effect of banks' BCR on firm investment through financial constraints under Japanese banking regulations rather than the effect of bank health in general. The use of the BCR is essential for quantifying the counterfactual policy effect of capital injection because we can construct the counterfactual value of the BCR without capital injection from the detailed bank-level information of capital injections in 1998-1999. Using regression analysis of loan growth on the ratio of the capital injection amount to bank equity and bank BCR as well as various firm-and bank-level covariates, we find that the coefficient of the capital injection and that of the bank's BCR are both positive and significant. Furthermore, by dividing the sample by firm-level TFP, we also find that the positive effects of capital injection and bank BCR become stronger for high TFP firms.
These results indicate that the government capital injections and the higher BCR help banks to increase their supply of loans to firms. The positive coefficient of the capital injection is consistent with the improvement in banks' willingness to lend in response to the capital injections as evidenced in the Bank of Japan's TANKAN. 2 Estimation of a linear investment model shows that the coefficient of the interaction between the weighted average of banks' BCR and the firm-level total factor productivity 2 Figure 1 shows that the number of firms answering that their banks' lending attitudes are severe (solid line) falls after the capital injections into banks that took place in March 1998 and 1999. On the other hand, the number of firms answering that their banks' lending attitudes are accommodative (dashed line) increases slightly after the 1998 capital injection and sharply after the 1999 capital injection.
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(TFP) measure is positive and significant. This result suggests that banks' BCR matters in firms' investment decisions when firms are productive and thus have higher demand for investment. Using the estimated model, we conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify the effect of capital injections that took place in March 1998 and 1999 in Japan. The counterfactual experiments suggest that the capital injections had a negligible impact on the average investment rate, although there is a reallocation effect, with investment shifted from low-to high-productivity firms.
The paper most closely related to ours is that of GS, who also examine the effects of bank recapitalization policies on the supply of credit and client firm performance, including firm investment, using matched firm-bank data from the Japanese banking crisis. The authors find that the size of the capital injection is important for its success: If capital injections are large enough so that recapitalized banks achieve capital requirements, such banks increase the supply of credit and firms that borrow from the recapitalized banks increase their investment. This paper's contribution beyond that of GS is as follows. First, we examine whether firms' loan and investment responses to their banks' recapitalization depend on their TFP. This question naturally arises because, theoretically, the higher firm productivity, the larger firm investment and the demand for external finance tend to be. Therefore, bank lending attitude, which likely depends on BCR under the banking regulation, may be more important for high-productivity firms. The finding that high-productivity firms increase their investments more than low-productivity firms in response to their associated banks' recapitalization would suggest that the resource is allocated toward more productive firms as a result of capital injection. 3 Second, we use the BCR as the main variable to assess the effect of capital injections. Despite the well-known issue of overstating their net wealth when banks report their capital ratios, examining how the reported BCR is related to firms' investment decisions is important in this context because it is the reported BCR that matters under the capital requirements for banks. By focusing on the BCR, our analysis examines a specific mechanism through which capital injections affects banks' loan decisions and firm investment; that is, capital injection helps undercapitalized banks meet the capital ratio requirement specified under Basel I regulations. For a robustness check, we also report the results based on alternative, conservative measures of BCR that take into account deferred tax assets as well as defaulted loans. Furthermore, the use of the BCR facilitates a counterfactual experiment based on the counterfactual value of the BCR without capital injection. This paper also contributes to the empirical literature on the effect of financial constraints on firm investment (e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988) ; Hoshi et al. (1991) ; Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ). Empirical papers on the effect of financial constraints use various observed measures of financial constraint, such as cash flow, firm size, and years of establishment, to examine their effect on investment. It is often difficult, however, to interpret these empirical results because such measures of financial constraint can be viewed as endogenous variables and correlated with the firm's efficiency measure, which also explains investment.
For example, a positive estimate of the cash flow coefficient could just reflect its positive correlation with firm efficiency. This paper examines how the BCR of the bank with which a firm has a relationship influences the firm's investment decisions. To the extent that the BCR measure is viewed as more exogenous than other measures of financial constraint, this paper's results shed further light on the impact of financial constraints on investment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes banking regulations and bank recapitalization policies during the Japanese banking crisis of the late 1990s. Section 3 describes our data sources and reports descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis on the effects of capital injection policies on banks' regulatory capital ratio, the supply of credit, and corporate investment. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Banking Regulation and Recapitalization Policies in Japan
This section briefly explains banking regulations, particularly the Prompt Corrective Action scheme and recapitalization policies for banks during Japan's banking crisis in the late 6 1990s. 4 Recognizing a large amount of non-performing loans accumulated in the financial sector after the collapse of asset prices, as early as 1995, the Ministry of Finance started discussing a Prompt Corrective Action scheme with which the government could order undercapitalized banks to take remedial action. 5 In December 1996, the Ministry of Finance published the basic framework of the Prompt Corrective Action that was set to take effect in April 1998. In preparation, many banks tried to improve their regulatory capital ratio, on which the regulations were based. Because one way to do so was to decrease risky assets such as corporate loans, the government was concerned about creating a credit crunch. Therefore, the government decided to allow some flexibility for banks in the scheme's implementation.
For example, banks were allowed to choose between market and book values for their stocks and real estate holdings so that they did not have to report unrealized losses on securities in their trading account or they could include unrealized capital gains in their real estate assets in their capital. With such changes in place, the government officially introduced the Prompt Corrective Action in April 1998.
For banks with international operations, the regulation applies the risk-based capital adequacy ratio specified in the Basel I capital requirements. The BCR is defined as BCR = Tier I + Tier II + Tier III − Goodwill Risk weighted asset .
Tier I capital, or core capital, mainly consists of equity capital and capital reserves. Tier II capital consists of 45% of unrealized capital gains on equity, 45% of the difference between any revalued land assets and their book value, general loan loss provisions (up to 1.25% of the risk-weighted asset), nonperpetual subordinated debt, and preferred stocks with more than five years to maturity. Tier III capital consists of (short-term) subordinated debt with more than two years to maturity. In response to these failures, the Diet passed the Financial Function Stabilization Act, which allowed the government to use 30 trillion yen of public funds. Then, in March 1998, the Japanese government injected 1.8 trillion yen into all of the major (city) banks, as well as several regional banks. In this capital injection, all the major banks received 100 billion yen through subordinated debt, except for Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, which received 99 billion yen through preferred shares. In the fall of 1998, the Financial Supervisory Agency conducted an intensive examination of the assets of 19 major banks and concluded that the previous assessment was too optimistic. In October 1998, the Diet passed the Prompt Recapitalization Act, which doubled the amount of funds to 60 trillion yen. In
October and December of 1998, however, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) and Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) were nationalized. To stabilize the banking sector, the Japanese government conducted a second round of capital injection into banks, with 7.5 trillion yen in March 1999. Detailed data on the amount of capital injection each bank received are publicly available. 7 Therefore, we are able to calculate counterfactual capital ratios without capital injections by subtracting the injected amounts from the bank capital.
Data Source and Variable Definition
To examine the effect of government capital injections into banks on corporate investment, we combine corporate investment data with bank balance sheet data. 8 For corporate balance sheet information, we use the data set compiled by the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ).
Because the DBJ data set does not contain data for financial institutions, we obtain data on bank balance sheet information from Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest (Nikkei NEEDS) and the "Analysis of Financial Statements of All Banks" by the Japanese Bankers Association (JBA).
The DBJ data set contains detailed financial statement information for (non-financial) firms publicly traded in Japanese stock markets. In particular, it provides data on fixed assets at the component level, such as land, building, and machinery. Furthermore, it provides data on outstanding loans by financial institutions, which we use to combine with the Nikkei NEEDS and JBA data. 9 Nikkei NEEDS and the JBA provide data on bank BCRs and non-performing loans, as well as standard bank balance sheet information. 10
In a given year, each firm borrows from multiple banks. Table 1 Table 5 of Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) . The original data can be found at the website of the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan.
8 We follow Nagahata and Sekine (2005) in combining the two data sets. 9 Fiscal year-end months differ across firms, while all banks end their fiscal year in March in our data set. To reflect the timing of capital injections in March of 1998 and 1999, we match firm balance sheet information in year t + 1 with bank balance sheet information in year t if the closing month of the firms is January or February and match firm observations in year t with bank observations in year t otherwise.
10 In some years, the BCR data are missing from the Nikkei NEEDS data and we therefore use BCR data from the JBA in these years. 9 the number of banks tends to increase with the number of firm employees. The average loan share of the top bank, that is, the bank from which firms borrow the most , is 34%, while the average loan share of the top five banks is 77%, where the loan share of bank k is defined as the ratio of the loan supply from bank k to total outstanding loans from all financial institutions. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables in 1997-2000 we use in our empirical analysis. 11 For bank k in year t, we define the variable BCR kt as the difference between the bank's BCR and the required ratio under banking regulations in Japan (8% for internationally operating banks and 4% for domestically operating banks). To measure the average BCR of the banks each firm borrows from, for firm i in year t, we define a variable BCR it as the weighted average of BCR kt over the banks from which firm i borrows, using the banks' outstanding loans in the pre-sample period of 1995-1997 as weights. Peek and Rosengren (2005) argue that bank health is much better reflected by stock returns than by reported risk-based capital ratios, because Japanese banks hid losses on their balance sheets using a variety of techniques during the 1990s. 12 We use the BCR because we are interested in a specific mechanism: the effect of the BCR reported in banks' financial statements on investments amid financial constraint under Japanese banking regulations rather than the effect of bank health in general. In this context, the use of the reported Basel I capital adequacy ratio could be justified to the extent that the banking regulations directly apply to the BCR reported on banks' financial statements. Further, the use of the BCR is essential for quantifying the policy effect of capital injection, because we can construct the counterfactual value of the BCR without capital injection from the detailed bank-level capital injection information in 1998-1999 but constructing counterfactual stock 11 Appendix A explains in detail how we construct the variables we use in our analysis from the original data.
12 The LTCB and NCB, which were nationalized in October and December 1998, largely underreported their non-performing loans and losses arising from write-offs of such loans for the 1997 fiscal year. Therefore, we do not use the data on the capital ratios of LTCB and NCB in our analysis. For example, for each firm, we calculate the weighted average of BCR kt over the banks from which the given firm borrows, except for the LTCB and NCB. Then, we exclude firms borrowing mainly from the LTCB or NCB from the benchmark sample while including a dummy variable taking the value of one if outstanding loans from the LTCB and NCB (in the pre-sample period) exceeded 10% of the total loans in the investment regressions. To mitigate the well-known reporting bias of BCR, we also perform a robustness check by adopting conservative measures of BCR that take into account deferred tax assets as well as defaulted loans.
returns would be difficult. 13 Table 3 describes our benchmark sample for estimating our firm investment model. We focus on manufacturing firms. Our main sample period runs from 1997 to 2000, although we also use data from 1995-1996 to compute the pre-sample period's loan shares. We first drop observations missing investment rates or Basel I capital adequacy ratios. We then drop observations with a machine investment rate (the ratio of machine investment to machine capital stock) greater than 2 or less than −2. We further drop the observations of firms that owe more than 20% of total outstanding long-term loans to banks missing BCR data from Nikkei NEEDS during 1997-2000 . We also drop the observations of firms that borrowed mainly from the LTCB, NCB, insurance companies, and government financial institutions, because the LTCB and NCB were nationalized in 1998 and insurance companies If, indeed, the effect of the capital injections of 1998 and 1999 on the Basel I capital adequacy ratio was substantial, as shown in Figure 4 , the capital injection must have made it easier to meet the required capital ratio under Japanese bank regulations, which, in turn, could have increased the supply of bank loans and promoted firm investment. Next, we examine the effect of capital injection on the supply of bank loans and firm investment decisions with regression analysis.
Bank Loan and Capital Injection
We first examine how capital injection into banks affected the supply of bank loans to firms using the panel data set from 1995 to 2000. In contrast to the analysis by GS, ours highlights the role of the Basel I capital adequacy ratio and uses the sample period after the introduction of Japanese banking regulations on capital ratios. Specifically, we examine how the size of capital injections to bank k relative to bank's capital in the previous year is related to the growth rate of loans firm i receives from bank k by estimating the following regression for t = 1998, 1999, and 2000: 14
where ∆ ikt / ik,t−1 is the growth rate of loans from bank k to firm i in year t. The main explanatory variables of interest are the amount of capital injection into bank k in year t relative to its previous year's equity, denoted Injection kt /e kt−1 , and the difference between the Basel I capital adequacy ratio and the required ratio under banking regulations at the end of the previous year, denoted BCR kt−1 . In Equation (1), we include the average share of bank k's loans among total loans to firm i in the pre-sample years (1995) (1996) (1997) , denoted ω ik , where we use the pre-sample period's weights in our baseline specification to mitigate concerns about the endogenous determination of loan shares. Following GS, we interact ω ik with other explanatory variables.
We include firm and bank dummies, denoted D k to control for bank-firmlevel unobserved heterogeneity arising from endogenous matching. 15 We also include time-varying bank-level variables Z b kt = (BCR kt−1 , Domestic kt−1 ) and firm-level variables Z f it = (ln T F P it−1 , ln K it−1 , Cash it−1 /K it−1 , b it−1 /Collat. it−1 ) . The variable Domestic kt−1 is a dummy variable that takes the unit value if bank k operates only in the domestic market in year t − 1, ln T F P it−1 is the log of TFP of firm i in year t − 1, 16 ln K it−1 is the log of capital stock at the end of year t − 1, Cash it−1 /K it−1 is the ratio of cash holdings to capital stock in year t − 1, and b it−1 /Collat it−1 is the ratio of total debt to the collateral value of land and capital stocks, where Collat it−1 is defined by
Collat it−1 = 0.1573K it−1 + 0.6777Land it−1 withK it−1 representing the sum of machinery, 15 For a robustness check, we also consider the interaction term between the year dummy and the firm dummy, D . Note, however, that by controlling for time-varying firm-level unobservables, the coefficient of Injection kt /e kt−1 shows the relative effect of capital injection on bank k's loan to firm i, keeping the firm-level loan amount constant. Because the effect on total loan amount is important for firm's investment decision, which is our main focus, we omit this specification in our empirical analysis.
16 The TFP measure is constructed from the estimated production function, where we follow the estimation procedure proposed by Gandhi et al. (2013) . For a robustness check, we also estimate the firm-level TFP by system GMM and by the Solow residual, assuming the Cobb-Douglas production function. The results are similar to the ones presented in Table 4 and available upon request.
instruments and tools, and transportation equipment, Land it−1 land stock, and the weights (0.1573 and 0.6777) taken from Ogawa and Suzuki (2000) . Table 4 presents the estimation results. We use the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital injections to compute the variable Injection kt /e kt−1 in columns (1) to (3), while we only use Tier 1 capital injections in columns (4) to (6). In columns (3) and (6), we include the interaction of the firm and bank dummies to control for bank-firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. 17 Across different specifications and alternative measures of capital injection in Table 4 , we find that the coefficient of (Injection kt /e kt−1 ) × ω ik is significantly positive, indicating that banks that received government capital injections increased their supply of bank loans to firms. Furthermore, the coefficient of BCR kt−1 × ω ik is positive and significant and, therefore, banks with a high BCR increased their supply of loans to firms more than banks with a low BCR did during the financial crisis period of 1998-2000.
Besides a bank's injection ratio and BCR, the coefficient of b it−1 /Collat it−1 × ω ik is negative and significant. The coefficient of ln T F P × ω ik is significantly negative in column (2), although it is insignificant in other specifications. To further examine the effect of the firm-level TFP, we split the sample into high and low TFP firms and run the same regressions for each sub-sample. Table 5 reports the results of the sub-sample analysis.
Columns (1) and (2) report the results for firms whose average TFP over the [1995] [1996] [1997] period is above the 90th percentile, while columns (3) and (4) are for firms whose average TFP over the 1995-1997 period is below the 10th percentile. We find that the coefficients of Injection kt /e kt−1 × ω ik and BCR kt−1 × ω ik are positive and significant in columns (1) and (2), while the estimates of the same coefficients are insignificant in columns (3) and (4). Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of bank's injection ratio and BCR are larger in Table 5 than those in Table 4 , suggesting larger effects of capital injection for high TFP firms.
Although the Prompt Corrective Action regulates the capital ratio of banks, the re-ported regulatory capital ratio may not fully capture banks' financial health and could have overstated their net wealth. We examine the robustness of the results by constructing alternative measures of capital ratios to deal with the known issue of reported capital ratios.
First, following Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) and Nagahata and Sekine (2005) , we subtract from bank capital deferred tax assets, which is future tax deductions that banks can claim for past losses, because deferred tax assets disappear if banks do not have a positive taxable income within five years. Second, we subtract defaulted loans to take into account the future cost of writing off such loans. Table 6 reports the estimation results of the loan growth model with alternative measures of bank capital ratios. In columns (1) and (2), we modify the regulatory bank capital ratio by subtracting deferred tax assets and defaulted loans from bank capital. The computation of this modified capital ratio requires detailed data on bank capital components such as Tier I and II capital, as well as risk-weighted assets. Because the breakdown data are not available for some banks, the sample size is smaller in columns (1) and (2). 18 Thus, in columns (3) and (4), we calculate an alternative bank capital ratio by using publicly available balance sheet information only so that we can compute the conservative bank capital ratio adjusted to deferred tax assets and defaulted loans for more banks. Because it is not appropriate to subtract the minimum capital requirement from the balance sheetbased capital ratio, we include the variable BCR kt−1 × Domestic kt−1 × ω ik to distinguish between international and domestic banks. The estimation results show that the coefficients of (Injection kt /e kt−1 ) × ω ik and BCR kt−1 × ω ik are positive and significant.
Machine Investment and Capital Injection
We now examine firm machine investment rates. Given the capital requirements imposed by Japanese banking regulations, financially troubled banks could restrict the supply of credit to increase their regulatory BCR, which could affect corporate investment when firms are financially constrained. Our investment model takes into account this potential dependence of investment on bank capital ratio in addition to standard firm characteristics such as size and productivity. Specifically, we estimate the following linear investment model:
where the dependent variable
is the ratio of machine investment in year t to machine capital stock in year t − 1. The variable BCR it−1 is the weighted average of BCR less the required capital ratio in year t − 1 across the banks firm i borrows from, where the weights are constructed from the pre-sample loan shares in 1995-1997, computed as BCR it−1 := k ω ik BCR kt−1 . We also include the interaction of BCR it−1 with ln T F P it−1 to examine how the effect of a bank's BCR depends on firm productivity. The vector Z it contains In the benchmark analysis, we construct data on ln T F P it−1 by estimating a firm-level production function with the method proposed by Gandhi et al. (2013) . As a robustness check, we also report the results with TFP estimates from the system GMM and the Solow residual in Table 8 . 19
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 presents the estimates of equation (2). The coefficient of BCR it−1 is not significant in column (1), perhaps due to a lack of statistical power, given that we control for firm fixed effects with a short panel of three years. On the other hand, in column (2), the significantly positive interaction term between BCR it−1 and the logarithm of TFP implies that improvements in bank capital ratios could induce larger investments among firms with higher productivity. Conditioning on capital stock levels, whose estimated coefficient is significantly negative, we find an increase in productivity to be associated with higher demand for capital investment but firms are able to invest only if banks are healthy and willing to supply loans.
19 Appendix B explains the estimation method proposed by Gandhi et al. (2013) and the system GMM. To obtain the firm-level Solow residual, we assume constant returns to scale in a Cobb-Douglas specification and set the coefficients for labor and intermediate inputs to the observed cost shares of the respective inputs.
We also examine the effect of capital injections on investments by estimating the following model:
where the variable (Injection/e) it := k ω ik (Injection kt /e it−1 ) is the weighted average of the ratio of the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital injections in year t to bank k's equity in year t − 1 across banks firm i borrows from, using weights constructed from pre-sample year loan shares in column (3) of Table 7 and Tier 1 capital injection in place of the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital injections in column (4). As shown in columns (3) and (4), across different specifications and different measures of capital injections, the interaction of (Injection/e) it with the logarithm of TFP is significantly positive, indicating that the effect of capital injections into associated banks on firm investment is larger among firms with higher productivity. This finding suggests that banks that received capital injections improved their capital ratios and became more willing to lend, which led to an increase in investments among firms with high productivity growth. Table 8 reports the estimation results with alternative bank capital ratios and firm-level TFP measures. In columns (1) and (2), we examine the effects of the alternative bank capital ratios adjusted to deferred tax assets and defaulted loans, as in Table 6 . Although the coefficient of ln TFP it−1 × BCR it−1 becomes slightly smaller and, likely because of the smaller sample size, statistically insignificant in column (1), the effect of the interaction term is larger and statistically significant in column (2). Columns (3) and (4) report results with alternative firm-level TFP measures constructed by the system GMM and Solow residual, respectively. These two columns show that the empirical patterns found in Table 7 are robust, with a positive and significant coefficient of ln TFP it−1 × BCR it−1 .
Using the estimated models (2) and (3), we quantify the effect on corporate investment of capital injections that took place in March 1998 and 1999 in Japan. Specifically, we first compute the counterfactual BCR without capital injections and then calculate the counterfactual changes in investment rates by taking the difference between the predicted investment rates based on the actual and counterfactual BCR values. Table 9 reports the mean changes in the investment rates for the whole sample and by percentiles of ln TFP it−1 . In this table, we use the estimates reported in column (2) of Table 7 and construct the counterfactual BCR by simply subtracting the injection amounts from a bank's Tier I and Tier II capital while keeping risk-weighted assets constant. The results show that, for firms with TFP above the 90th percentile, the investment rates would have been 0.2% lower in 1998 and 1.1% lower in 1999 without the capital injections in those years. For the rest of the firms, however, the investment rates would have been higher. Table 9 also reports the results for alternative measures of bank capital ratios, where we subtract deferred tax assets and defaulted loans from the regulatory bank capital. With the alternative measures of the bank capital ratios, the effects of capital injections tend to be larger. In particular, in the panel labelled Adjusted BCR 2 where we compute the bank capital ratio by using publicly available balance sheet information with the adjustment to deferred tax assets and defaulted loans, the investment rates would have been lower for firms with TFP above the 25th percentile in both 1998 and 1999 and, for firms with TFP above the 90th percentile, the investment rates would have dropped by 2.5% in 1999. Table 10 reports the results of the same counterfactual experiments, except that we now construct the counterfactual BCR without capital injections based on the estimated regression of the BCR on the lagged capital ratio, the ratio of the injection amount to equity and year dummies. Table 11 reports the results of the counterfactual experiments from investment model (3) based on the estimates reported in column (3) of Table (7) . The quantitative effects are similar to those reported in Table 9 .
Conclusion
In this study, we examine the effect of government capital injections into financially troubled banks on the level of corporate investment during the Japanese banking crisis of the late 1990s. By combining the balance sheet data of Japanese manufacturing firms with banks' balance sheet data, we first estimate the effects of capital injections and bank regulatory capital ratios on the growth of loans to firms and confirm that the effects are positive and significant. Recapitalization policies can promote the investment of client firms if capital injections help banks respond to loan demands. To test this mechanism empirically, we model corporate investment as a function of not only standard firm characteristics, such as size and productivity, but also banks' regulatory capital ratio. By estimating a linear investment model, we find that the coefficient of the interaction between firm TFP and bank capital ratios is positive and significant, suggesting that a bank's capital ratio matters for more productive firms. Furthermore, we conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify the effect of capital injections that took place in March 1998 and 1999 in Japan. The counterfactual experiments suggest that the capital injections had a negligible impact on the average investment rate, although there is a reallocation effect, with investment shifting from low-to high-productivity firms.
Our analysis differs in two important ways from that of GS, who also examine the effects of bank recapitalization policies on the supply of credit and client firms' performance, including firm investment, using data from the Japanese banking crisis. First, we uncover empirical patterns of how capital injections affect corporate investment by interacting banks' regulatory capital ratio and capital injection amounts with firms' TFP. Our estimation results show that the coefficients of these interaction terms are positive and significant in the investment regressions. Second, we focus on the specific mechanism of capital injections helping undercapitalized banks meet the capital requirements imposed by Japanese banking regulations. To do so, we use banks' regulatory capital ratio as the main variable to assess the effect of capital injections. Use of the regulatory capital ratio also enables us to conduct counterfactual experiments based on the counterfactual values of the regulatory capital ratio without capital injections.
It is worth noting that the objective of this paper is limited and does not aim to examine the effect of capital injection in general. This is an important limitation, because capital injections are likely to have had important impacts on the Japanese economy through other mechanisms, such as by promoting the write-off of non-performing loans and stabilizing the financial system.
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Appendix A: Development Bank of Japan Data
The data set compiled by the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) contains detailed corporate balance sheet/ income statement data for firms listed on the stock markets in Japan. In our analysis, we deflate all nominal variables by the monthly Corporate Goods Price Index (CGPI) for all goods. If firms change their closing dates, the data after the change may refer to fewer than 12 months. When this occurs, we multiply the data x it by 12/m, where m represents the number of months to which the data refer. The rest of this section explains how we construct variables from the original data.
A.1 Variable Construction
Capital Stock (other than Land)
The DBJ data set provides a breakdown of capital stock data between six capital goods:
(1) nonresidential buildings; (2) structures; (3) machinery; (4) transportation equipments;
(5) instruments and tools; (6) inventory method, we reset the stock value to the book value for the year. We multiply real capital stock by the corresponding CGPI series to obtain data on capital stock in current yen. In our analysis, we define machine capital by the sum of machinery and transportation equipment.
Land
Setting the land depreciation rate to zero and using the last in, first out method to evaluate inventory, we construct nominal investment as follows:
where p land s is the price of land at which land was last bought (Hoshi and Kashyap (1990) ; Hayashi and Inoue (1991) ).
With the nominal investment series and the depreciation rate, which is set to zero, we construct data on the nominal stock of land through the perpetual inventory method, (pK) it = (p t /p t−1 )(pK) it−1 + (pI) it , where (pK) it represents the value of firm i's land stock in current yen in period t, (pI) it is the value of land investment in current yen, and p t is the price of land in period t. For the base year, we use a book-to-market ratio to convert the book value of land stocks into their market value. For the book-to-market ratio, following Hayashi and Inoue (1991) , we use an estimate of the market value of land owned by non-financial corporations from the National Income Accounts and the book value from Corporate Statistics Annual.
Net Debt
For debt, we use the sum of short-and long-term borrowing and corporate bonds. Net debt is then computed by subtracting the amount of deposits from the debt.
Output
The nominal output for period t is total sales plus changes in the inventories of finished goods.
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Appendix B: Estimation of Production Function B.1 Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers, 2013 (GNR) This section briefly explains the estimation procedure proposed by GNR . Consider
is an unexpected idiosyncratic shock that is unknown when the input choice M it is made in period t, and η it is an innovation to ω it that is unknown in period t − 1 but known when the input choice M it is made in period t. The shocks it and η it are independent and identically distributed, with mean zero and standard deviations σ and σ η , respectively. In what follows, we denote the logarithmic values of (
We assume that M it is a flexible input. As GNR discuss, the identification problem arises because m it is a deterministic function of (ω it , k it , it ) and there is no cross-sectional variation that will allow us to identify the coefficient of m it once (ω it , k it , it ) is conditioned on. To deal with the identification problem, we exploit the first-order condition with respect to M it . The first-order condition is written as follows:
where
, it follows that
Then, we have
Following GNR, we estimate (4) by nonlinear least squares. In the estimation, we approximate G(L it , K it , M it ) by a polynomial of order two, denoted G 2 ; that is,
Using estimates of γ r l ,r k ,rm , we obtain the estimate of the residual, denotedˆ it . Note that, if G is a polynomial of order r, the integral of G has the following closed-form solution:
As GNR, we approximate C(L it , K it ) by a polynomial of order two; that is,
Using ω it (α), we defineη it (α) by 21
To estimate α, we use the following moment conditions:
B.2 System GMMà la Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) We consider the following production function:
where y it is the logarithm of the total gross output, it is the logarithm of labor input, k it is the logarithm of capital input, and m i t is the logarithm of intermediate input. The variable ω it represents the persistent component of TFP and follows the AR(1) process, where η it is independent of ω i,t−1 . The variable it is a measurement error.
One of the main econometric issues in estimating the production function (6)- (7) is the simultaneity of a productivity shock ω it and input decisions. All the input variables, it , k it , and m it , are likely to be correlated with productivity shock ω it and the ordinary least squares estimate will be biased.
To estimate the production function consistently, we first take a "quasi-difference,"
y it − ρy i,t−1 , to eliminate ω it and ω i,t−1 as
Then, we apply the system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate the parameter vector π = (π 1 , π 2 , π 3 , π 4 , π 5 , π 6 , π 7 ) without imposing cross-parameter constraints. We also include the year dummies. Here, k it is a predetermined variable so that E[∆ω it k i,t−s ] = 0 holds for s = 1, 2, ..., while it and m it are endogenous variables, where E[∆ω it i,t−s ] = 0 and E[∆ω it m i,t−s ] = 0 hold for s = 2, 3, .... We also use additional moment conditions implied by initial conditions under stationarity. After estimating π by the GMM estimation procedure, we impose cross-parameter restrictions, such as π 5 = −ρα k , by using minimum distance to obtain consistent estimates of (α , α k , α m , ρ). Notes: The summary statistics for Firm-bank-level variable and Bank-level variable are computed from the firm-bank observations and bank observations used in estimating column (3) of Table 4 . The summary statistics for the other firm-level variables are computed from the firm-level observations used in estimating Table 7 that satisfy the sample selection criteria reported in Table 3 . The variable ∆ ikt / ik,t−1 denotes the growth of loans of bank k to firm i between years t − 1 and t; ω ik is the average share of bank k's loans among total loans to firm i in the pre-sample years (1995) (1996) (1997) ; Injection kt /e k,t−1 (Tier 1 + Tier 2) is the amount of capital injection into bank k' Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital in year t relative to its previous year's equity; Injection kt /e k,t−1 (Tier 1 only) is the ratio of the capital injection amount into Tier 1 capital to the bank's previous year's equity; BCR kt−1 is the difference between the bank's BCR and the required ratio under Japanese banking regulations; Domestic kt−1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if bank k operates only in the domestic market in year t − 1; Im,it/Km,it−1 is the ratio of firm i's investment to its previous year's assets; BCRit−1 is the weighted average of BCR kt over the banks from which firm i borrows; (Injection/e) it−1 (Tier 1 + Tier 2) is the ratio of the weighted average of Tier 1 and Tier 2 injections to equity; (Injection/e) it−1 (Tier 1 only) is the ratio of the weighted average of Tier 1 injection to equity; ln TFPit−1 is the logarithm of firm i's TFP in year t − 1; bit−1/Collat.it−1 is the ratio of total debt to the collateral value of land and capital stocks of firm i in year t − 1; Cashit−1/Kit−1 is the ratio of firm i's cash holdings to capital stock in year t − 1; and Domesticit−1 is the weighted average of Domestic kt−1 over the banks from which firm i borrows. Notes: The matched firm-bank observations for t = 1998, 19999, and 2000 are used for estimation, where the numbers of observations are unbalanced across different specifications because of missing values for some regressors. The dependent variable is the growth rate of loans from bank k to firm i. The variable ω ik is the average share of bank k's loans among firm i's total loans in the pre-sample years from 1995 to 1997. The variable Injection kt /e k,t−1 is the ratio of the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital injections in year t to bank k's equity in year t − 1 in columns (1) to (5), while we use Tier 1 capital injections in place of the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital injections in columns (6) to (10). The variable BCR k,t−1 is defined as the BCR less the required capital ratio (8% for internationally operated banks and 4% for domestic banks) in year t − 1; Domestic kt−1 is a dummy variable that takes the unit value if bank k is a domestically operating bank in year t − 1; ln T F P is the logarithm of firm i's TFP in year t − 1; ln Kit−1 is the logarithm of capital stock for firm i in year t − 1; bit−1/Collat.it−1 is the ratio of total debt to the collateral values of land and capital stocks for firm i in year t − 1; and Cashit−1/Kit−1 is the ratio of cash holdings to capital stocks for firm i in year t − 1. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are in brackets. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Notes: The matched firm-bank observations for t = 1998, 19999, and 2000 are used for estimation, where the numbers of observations are unbalanced across different specifications because of missing values for some regressors. The dependent variable is the growth rate of loans from bank k to firm i. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for firms whose average TFP over the 1995-1997 period is above the 90th percentile. Columns (3) and (4) report the results for firms whose average TFP over the 1995-1997 period is below the 10th percentile. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are in brackets. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Notes: The matched firm-bank observations for t = 1998, 19999, and 2000 are used for estimation, where the numbers of observations are unbalanced across different specifications because of missing values for some regressors. The dependent variable is the growth rate of loans from bank k to firm i. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for a modified BCR of bank k, with deferred tax assets and defaulted loans subtracted from the bank capital. Columns (3) and (4) use the capital ratio based on the balance sheet data in which deferred tax assets and defaulted loans are subtracted from the bank capital. Other covariates are the same as those used in Table 4 . Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are in brackets. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Notes: The matched firm-bank observations for accounting year 1998-2000 are used for estimation, where the numbers of observations are unbalanced across different specifications because of missing values for some regressors. The dependent variable is the ratio of machine investment in year t to the beginning-of-period machine capital stock in year t. Column (1) reports results with a modified BCR for bank k, with deferred tax assets and defaulted loans subtracted from the bank capital. Column (3) uses the capital ratio based on the balance sheet data in which deferred tax assets and defaulted loans are subtracted from the bank capital. Other covariates are the same as those used in Table 7 . Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level are in brackets. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Notes: Columns (1) to (7) report mean changes in the investment rates by the percentile of ln TFP it−1 . We construct the counterfactual BCR without capital injections based on the estimated regression of the BCR on the lagged capital ratio, the ratio of the injection amount to equity, year dummies, and bank fixed effects. The sample for 1998-2000 is used to compute the percentiles of ln TFP it−1 . The rows designated No 1998 Injection report the counterfactual mean changes in the investment rates if there was no capital injection in March 1998, while the rows designated No 1999 Injection report the counterfactual mean changes in the investment rates without the March 1999 capital injection. 
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